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ABSTRACT 
Energy consumption is critical to economic growth and quality of life. America’s energy system, 
however, is malfunctioning. The status quo is characterized by a tilted playing field, where 
energy choices are based on the visible costs that appear on utility bills and at gas pumps. This 
system masks the “external” costs arising from those energy choices, including shorter lives, 
higher health care expenses, a changing climate, and weakened national security. As a result, we 
pay unnecessarily high costs for energy. New “rules of the road” could level the energy playing 
field. Drawing from our work for The Hamilton Project, this paper offers four principles for 
reforming U.S.  energy policies in order to increase Americans’ well-being. 
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Whether by heating our homes in winter, keeping the lights on in our offices, powering 
factories that manufacture goods, or fueling our automobiles, energy drives our economy and 
supports our quality of life. Thanks in part to an economic infrastructure heavily dependent on 
energy use–roads and highways, ports and railways, broadband and computer networks, 
manufacturing plants and shipping facilities–American workers and businesses are among the 
most productive in the world and the most globally integrated. A century of innovation, fueled 
by cheap and plentiful energy largely from coal, oil, and natural gas, has allowed the nation to 
transition from an agriculture-based economy to one based on high-value-added manufacturing 
and services aided by computerization. Our standard of living–among the highest on earth–
would not be possible without energy and the systems that have been developed to harness it.  
 Elsewhere in the world, developing economies are trying to catch up–both in terms of 
economic growth and quality of life–and are expanding their energy production infrastructures 
accordingly. For example, major rural electrification projects are under way in China and India 
to increase access to energy in villages and to mechanize farming tasks. Furthermore, both 
countries are rapidly increasing electricity production to feed their sharp industrial growth. 
Abroad, as at home, rising living standards and robust economic growth require access to 
plentiful, reliable, and inexpensive energy. 
 Unfortunately, the sources of energy that we have grown to rely on are more expensive 
than we once thought. The true cost of energy includes the price we pay at the gas pump or what 
shows up on the electric bill—known as the “private costs” —and also the less obvious impact of 
energy use on health, the environment, and national security. Economists refer to these additional 
damages as negative externalities, or “external costs”.  A more holistic accounting of the total 
costs of energy consumption that includes both the private and external costs is known as the 
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social cost of energy use.   Recent events like the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the death of 
twenty-nine West Virginia coal miners in the worst mining disaster in twenty-five years, and the 
crisis at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant are salient examples of the health and 
environmental costs, and economic risks, of our current energy sources. While these tragic 
disasters are the most obvious symbols of these costs, they are by no means the largest. 
 Our primary sources of energy impose significant health costs–particularly on infants and 
the elderly, our most vulnerable. For instance, even though many air pollutants are regulated 
under the Clean Air Act, fine particle pollution, or soot, still is estimated to contribute to roughly 
one out of every twenty premature deaths in the United States.1 Indeed, soot from coal power 
plants alone is estimated to cause thousands of premature deaths and hundreds of thousands of 
cases of illness each year.2 The resulting damages include costs from days missed at work and 
school due to illness, increases in emergency room and hospital visits, and other losses 
associated with premature deaths. In other countries the costs are still greater; recent research 
suggests that life expectancies in northern China are about five years shorter than in southern 
China due to the higher pollution levels in the north.3 The National Academy of Sciences 
recently estimated total non-climate-change-related damages associated with energy 
consumption and use to be more than $120 billion in the United States in 2005. Nearly all of 
these damages resulted from the effects of air pollution on our health and wellness.4  
                                                            
1 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, “EPA’s Transport Rule: What Does It Mean for 
Environmental Justice Communities?” September 2010, 
http://www.epa.gov/airtransport/pdfs/WebinarTransportRuleMaterials.pdf. 
2 Abt Associates, “Power Plant Emissions: Particulate Matter-Related Health Damages and the Benefits of 
Alternative Emission Reduction Scenarios,” Report for the Clean Air Task Force, June 2004, 
http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/Final_Power_Plant_Emissions_June_2004.pdf. 
3 Yuyu Chen, Avraham Ebenstein, Michael Greenstone, and Hongbin Li, “The Long-Run Impact of Air Pollution on 
Life Expectancy: Evidence from China’s Huai River Policy,” working paper, 2012. 
4 National Academy of Sciences, Hidden Costs of Energy (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2010), 
154. 
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 The external costs associated with using carbon-intensive fuels also include climate 
change. If carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions continue to rise at the current rate, they are likely to 
drive temperature changes that will have significant environmental and health consequences: 
rising sea levels, more frequent and more severe storms, increased flooding and drought, and 
other dramatic changes in weather patterns. These changes in turn could result in an increase in 
water- and insect-borne diseases, a loss of biodiversity, and the loss of human lives and 
livelihoods.5 The U.S. government recently developed a measure to monetize the damages 
caused by CO2 emissions: that is, the social cost of carbon. By this metric, carbon emissions in 
the United States resulted in almost $120 billion in damages globally in 2009.6 Other 
environmental costs associated with our current energy sources include the impact of acid rain on 
vegetation and lakes, the effect of ozone on agricultural productivity, and oil leaks and spills. 
Further, recent concerns about local damages associated with hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) 
extraction techniques underscore the land-use issues related to fuel extraction. 
 There are additional economic, political, and national security risks associated with 
current domestic energy policies. Oil plays an important role in the American economy: it 
powers most of the transportation sector and is an important input in many industries. Continuing 
turmoil in the Middle East has raised the profile of energy security and the geopolitical 
implications of reliance on oil. In part to protect major oil supplies, the United States has 
                                                            
5 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Summary for Policymakers,” in Climate Change 2007: The 
Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, ed. Susan Solomon, Dahe Qin, Martin Manning, Zhenlin Chen, Melinda Marquis, 
Kristen Averyt, Melinda M.B. Tignor, and Henry LeRoy Miller, Jr. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
6 Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, “Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon for 
Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866,” February 2010, 
http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/regulations/scc-tsd.pdf; Environmental Protection Agency, “Inventory of U.S. 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2009,” 2011, Table ES-2, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads11/US-GHG-Inventory-2011-Executive-Summary.pdf.  
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maintained a military presence in the Middle East for more than fifty years. On several 
occasions, it has become mired in military interventions to prevent oil supply disruptions, among 
other objectives.  
These costs–ranging from increases in lung disease and infant mortality to problems 
associated with climate change–have been quantified and can be expressed in dollar terms. And 
these costs can far exceed the price that appears on our utility bills or at the gas pump. For 
example, we estimate that it costs about 3.2¢ for an existing coal plant to produce a kilowatt hour 
(kWh) of electricity. But this inexpensive sticker price belies the more significant damages 
(estimated at roughly 5.6¢ per kWh) of coal-generated electricity to our well-being: shorter lives, 
higher health care bills, and a changing climate that poses risks to our way of life. The true social 
cost is almost three times the amount that appears on our utility bills. 
Current energy policy tilts the balance in favor of energy sources that appear cheap only 
because their costs to health, the climate, and national security are obscured or indirect. A better 
approach to energy policy should encourage fairer competition between energy sources by 
placing them on equal footing. Based on our work for The Hamilton Project, this paper offers 
four principles for reforming U.S. energy policies that would move the country in this direction.   
* * * 
The Benefits of Energy Use. The development and exploitation of inexpensive energy sources 
has been a key driver of economic development and quality of life. The story of the expansion of 
the U.S. economy, and of the advances and innovations that have made life better for Americans, 
leaps from one energy-harvesting invention to another: the cotton gin, the steam engine, the light 
bulb, the internal combustion engine, the turbine, the mechanized factory, the electrified city, and 
the computer. The development of coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear power and other energy sources 
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made all this progress possible and has helped support activity that is integral to our economy 
and quality of life.  
 Windmills and watermills, the first modes of generating mechanical energy, were used 
almost entirely for rudimentary tasks such as grinding grain and pumping water. The 
development of the steam engine in Britain in the mid-eighteenth century gave birth to industry 
by powering factories and cotton mills. In the late nineteenth century, the internal combustion 
engine, which runs the entire modern motor vehicle fleet, was invented. Around the same time, 
the light bulb was developed, allowing businesses to keep their doors open even after the sun had 
set and making it possible for employees to extend their workdays. 
 Today our economy is heavily reliant on electric power to run businesses and maintain 
quality of life. Data centers and server farms in the United States require massive amounts of 
energy. In 2006, they consumed 61 billion kWh of electricity (1.5 percent of total U.S. electricity 
consumption), more than was consumed by the nation’s televisions.7 Oil fuels more than 90 
percent of the nation’s motor vehicle fleet and is a critical fuel input for the entire transportation 
network. The benefits that energy provides, from home heating to facilitation of trade, are 
integral to our way of life. The United States consumes about one-fifth (21 percent) of the 
world’s energy, despite having less than 5 percent of the world’s population.8  
 But U.S. dominance in energy use is about to change. Developing countries–especially 
China and India–are rapidly increasing the amount of energy they consume as their economies 
grow and their citizens aspire to better living conditions (Figure 1). While access to plentiful 
                                                            
7 Environmental Protection Agency, ENERGY STAR Program, Report to Congress on Server and Data Center 
Energy Efficiency Public Law 109-431, August 2007, 7. 
8 Energy Information Administration, “Shares of World Energy Consumption in the United States, China, and India, 
1990–2035,” in 2010 International Energy Outlook (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 2010), Figure 14, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/world.html. 
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energy is important to maintaining the standard of living in the United States, it has taken on an 
even more vital role in emerging markets as they transition to a higher standard of living and 
more energy-intensive economies. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 - World Energy Consumption by Country, 1980 to 2008] 
 
A lack of reliable access to energy has been a major deterrent to economic growth and 
improved quality of life in most of the developing world. Almost one-fourth of the world’s 
population–most of which lives in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia–lacks access to 
electricity.9 Twice that number–half the world’s population–lacks access to clean cooking 
energy and relies on traditional biomass fuels (wood, dung, coal, and agricultural by-product
that produce smoke and other air pollutants.
s) 
 
e 
                                                           
10 Indeed, indoor smoke from solid fuels is believed
to have been the sixth-leading cause of death and fifth-leading cause of disability in low-incom
countries in 2004.11 “Energy poverty” and “fuel poverty” contribute to poverty, health problems 
that can result in lower life expectancy, diminished access to education and other productive 
activities, and lower rates of economic growth and productivity. 
 From facilitating trade to raising income and improving health, reliable access to energy 
could help reduce poverty and improve life expectancy in developing nations around the world. 
As these nations grow and transition, however, their reliance on fossil fuel–based energy sources 
will surge, creating another set of global challenges resulting from climate change. 
 
9 International Energy Agency, “Energy Poverty: How to Make Modern Energy Access Universal?” in World 
Energy Outlook 2010 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, September 2010), 7, 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/docs/weo2010/weo2010_poverty.pdf. 
10 United Nations Development Programme and World Health Organization, “The Energy Access Situation in 
Developing Countries,” November 2009, 1, http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/stream/asset/?asset_id=2205620. 
11 World Health Organization, “Global Health Risks: Mortality and Burden of Disease Attributable to Selected 
Major Risks,” 2009, 11–12, 
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/GlobalHealthRisks_report_full.pdf. 
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* * * 
The External Costs of Energy Use. The benefits of the energy sources that we currently rely on 
are obvious. But it is increasingly clear that the costs of our current sources go well beyond what 
we pay at the pump or to the utility company. These additional costs of energy use take a variety 
of forms, from the erosion of living standards to the diversion of taxpayer funds and other critical 
resources. They include increased health costs, shortened life spans, higher military expenditures 
and foreign policy constraints, expensive environmental cleanups, and the broad impacts of 
climate change–all of which are real costs that we impose on ourselves and on future 
generations.  
Health effects of current energy sources. The combustion of fossil fuels results in the 
release of pollutants that have a significant impact on the health and well-being of American 
society and the world. Air pollution’s greatest costs to society come from health impacts, which 
make up approximately 94 percent of external non-climate costs.12 Particulate air pollution, or 
soot, is associated with elevated mortality rates for adults and infants.13 In 2010, soot from U.S. 
coal-fired power plants was estimated to have caused 23,600 premature deaths and more than 
500,000 cases of respiratory illness.14 Soot and other pollutants such as sulfur dioxide (SO2), 
carbon monoxide (CO), and nitrogen oxides (NOx), which lead to ozone, all pose threats to well-
being, including higher mortality rates, more hospital admissions, restricted activity days, and 
increased expenditures on medications for respiratory problems.15  
                                                            
12 Nicholas Muller and Robert Mendelsohn, “Measuring the Aggregate Damages of Air Pollution in the United 
States,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 54 (2007): 1–14. 
13 Kenneth Chay and Michael Greenstone, “The Impact of Air Pollution on Infant Mortality: Evidence from 
Geographic Variation in Pollution Shocks Induced by a Recession,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (3) 
(August 2003). 
14 Abt Associates, “Power Plant Emissions.” 
15 Olivier Deschenes, Michael Greenstone, and Joseph Shapiro, “Defending against Environmental Insults: Drugs, 
Emergencies, Mortality and the NOx Budget Program Emissions Market,” working paper, 2011. 
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 The National Academy of Sciences estimates that electricity generation from coal, oil-
fueled vehicles and transportation, and electricity production from natural gas caused an 
estimated $120 billion in non-climate-change-related damages in 2005 (Figure 2).16 Health-
related damages account for almost all of these costs. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 - Main Sources of Non-Climate-Change-Related Damages, in 2005] 
 
The health consequences of other energy sources can be severe, as the nuclear crisis in 
Japan reminds us. Prior experiences with nuclear disasters suggest that they increase the 
incidence of cancer. Even at doses once thought to be harmless, children born in regions of 
Sweden that experienced higher radiation fallout from the disaster at Chernobyl have been 
shown to have reduced cognitive abilities, measured by school performance.17 
Climate-Change Impacts. Since the start of the Industrial Revolution, humans have been emitting 
a growing amount of greenhouse gases such as CO2, methane, and NOx into the atmosphere. 
Figure 3 shows that the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has risen by more than 23 
percent over the past fifty years.18 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
these rising levels of CO2 and other greenhouse gases will cause rising average global 
temperatures in the coming years and decades. If current emissions trends continue, global 
temperatures will increase by an estimated 4.3ºF to 11.5ºF (2.4ºC to 6.4ºC) by the end of the 
century, depending on the climate model and assumptions about economic growth.19  
 
                                                            
16 National Academy of Sciences, Hidden Costs of Energy. 
17 Douglas Almond, Lena Edlund, and Marten Palme, “Chernobyl’s Subclinical Legacy: Prenatal Exposure to 
Radioactive Fallout and School Outcomes in Sweden,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (4) (2009). 
18 KNMI Climate Explorer, http://climexp.knmi.nl/. 
19 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Summary for Policymakers,” in Climate Change 2007, ed. 
Solomon et al.  
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[Insert Figure 3 - Mean Global Temperature and Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations, 1900 to 
2099] 
 
The increase in average temperature is well-documented, but it is less clear how this will 
affect our lives. One way to illustrate the effect is to look at the incidence of very hot days. 
Figure 4 reports the current number of days per year when the temperature experienced by the 
average American falls into certain ranges. In recent history, it has been extremely rare for the 
average daily temperature (calculated as the average of the daily maximum and minimum) to 
exceed 90ºF; the average American experiences about one such day per year. But in the future, 
such extremely hot days are projected to become much more regular, occurring about forty times 
a year. This means the United States will experience roughly four times as many days when the 
temperature is hotter than 90ºF than days when it is below 30ºF. This projected change is 
troubling because the greatest damages from temperature, in terms of elevated rates of mortality 
and morbidity and reduced agricultural productivity, are concentrated at these high 
temperatures.20  
 
[Insert Figure 4- Current and Predicted End-of-Century Daily Temperatures] 
 
In addition to the increase in temperatures, the higher concentrations of greenhouse gases 
are expected to lead to other changes on our planet, including changes in precipitation patterns, 
weather variability, and rising sea levels. Together, these changes in climate are expected to lead 
to a series of adverse outcomes ranging from reduced agricultural productivity, increased 
                                                            
20 Olivier Deschenes and Michael Greenstone, "Climate Change, Mortality, and Adaptation: Evidence from Annual 
Fluctuations in Weather in the US," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3(4) (2011): 152–85; Robin 
Burgess, Olivier Deschenes, Dave Donaldson and Michael Greenstone, “Weather and Death in India,” working 
paper, 2011, http://dl.dropbox.com/u/2734209/BDDG_Weather_and_Death_paper.pdf 
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mortality rates, higher flood risks, greater rates of species extinction, compromised ecosystem 
services, and even increased conflict over scarce natural resources. Furthermore, there is rising 
concern about the possibility of a catastrophic event, such as a potentially discontinuous “tipping 
point” in the behavior of earth systems. 
 In the abstract, it is easy to understand that there is a wide range of risks for the United 
States and the world population associated with climate change. The challenge of summarizing 
and monetizing the costs–a necessary next step for informing policy-makers–has only recently 
been addressed. In 2010, a U.S. government working group estimated the global damages 
associated with the release of an additional ton of CO2 into the atmosphere, calling their estimate 
the social cost of carbon (SCC). The group concluded that the current SCC is roughly $21 per 
ton of CO2 emissions.21 To put that number in context, at a cost of $21 per ton, carbon emissions 
in the United States last year resulted in roughly $120 billion in global damages. The damages 
within the United States are projected to be smaller, ranging from about 7 to 23 percent of the 
total. Of course, the global and domestic damages apply regardless of where on the planet the 
emissions occur.22  
 With this estimate of the SCC, policy-makers now have a bright-line rule to identify 
effective policies, because they can quantify the benefits of regulations that would reduce carbon 
emissions. Indeed, the SCC has already become a standard tool in the evaluation of national 
policy choices. Since the release of the SCC values, the monetized benefits of CO2 emission 
reductions have been included in at least seven major regulations (those with costs or benefits 
                                                            
21 The $21 figure is the central value, and the U.S. government also recommended conducting sensitivity analyses at 
$5, $35, and $65. See Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon, “Technical Support Document.” 
22 For more information on how the SCC values were developed, see Michael Greenstone, Elizabeth Kopits, and 
Ann Wolverton, “Estimating the Social Cost of Carbon for Use in Federal Rulemakings: A Summary and 
Interpretation,” NBER Working Paper No. 16913, National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2011, 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16913.pdf. 
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above $100 million) across three federal departments and agencies. In Table 1 (discussed below), 
we use the SCC to quantify the climate-related damages from various energy sources.  
Other environmental and economic effects. Other aspects of energy production and 
consumption also impose external costs. For example, extracting, transporting, and consuming 
fuels such as coal and petroleum have adverse effects on the environment and impair our quality 
of life. The methods used to extract fuel, such as coal mining or offshore oil drilling, can be very 
disruptive to the surrounding ecosystem. Strip-mining, a form of surface mining that peels back 
layers of soil and rock to expose seams of mineral, destroys vegetation, displaces wildlife, and 
often permanently changes soil composition. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, which 
damaged both local ecosystems and local economies, is one illustration of the consequences of 
accidents. Air pollutants, like those that form acid rain or the airborne mercury from burning 
coal, have negative effects on trees, wildlife, ocean life, and soil quality. The smog that results 
from air pollutants impairs visibility and interferes with enjoyment of national parks and other 
scenic vistas.  
 Pollution also results in economic damages. Ozone can slow plant and crop growth and 
increase plants’ vulnerability to disease.23 Recent evidence suggests that air pollution has a 
significant impact on the health and productivity of workers and children’s absenteeism rates at 
school.24 Ozone, even at levels below Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards, has 
been shown to reduce the productivity of agricultural workers in California.25 
                                                            
23 Denise L. Mauzerall and Xiaoping Wang, “Protecting Agricultural Crops from the Effects of Tropospheric Ozone 
Exposure: Reconciling Science and Standard Setting in the United States, Europe and Asia,” Annual Review of 
Energy and the Environment 26 (2001): 237–268; John Reilly, Sergey Paltsev, Benjamin Felzer, Xiaoping Wang, 
David Kicklighter, Jerry Melillo, et al., “Global Economic Effects of Changes in Crops, Pasture, and Forests due to 
Changing Climate, Carbon Dioxide, and Ozone,” Energy Policy 35 (11) (2007): 5370–5383. 
24 Rema Hanna and Paulina Oliva, “The Effect of Pollution on Labor Supply: Evidence from a Natural Experiment 
in Mexico City,” NBER Working Paper No. 17302, National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2011; Janet 
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 Even some alternative energy sources, several of which have been heralded as the future 
of energy use, have significant environmental costs. Biofuels such as ethanol were once 
considered a promising substitute for carbon-intensive fuels. However, clearing the land, 
growing, transporting, and processing the crops used for biofuels results in large emissions of 
CO2. Examining the entire life cycle of production and consumption of biofuels suggests that at 
least some of them may be, on balance, worse for the environment than the entire energy cycle 
for oil. 
Macroeconomic stability and international security. Energy security has been a critical 
concern for U.S. policy-makers since at least the oil shocks of the 1970s. Although U.S. oil 
intensity–the amount of oil the United States consumes per dollar of economic activity–has been 
declining by about 2 percent per year since 1980, our economy remains heavily dependent on 
oil.26 In the transportation sector, there are almost no substitutes; oil meets more than 90 percent 
of U.S. fuel needs.27 Consequently, oil continues to play both a substantive and symbolic role in 
the economy. The challenges that arise from U.S. reliance on oil have both economic and 
geopolitical dimensions.  
 Dependence on oil imposes macroeconomic risks from oil shocks. Ten of the eleven 
postwar recessions followed an increase in the price of oil, including the most recent recession.28 
While some research suggests that oil shocks have had steadily smaller effects on economic 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Currie, Eric Hanushek, E. Megan Kahn, Matthew Neidell, and Steven Rivkin, “Does Pollution Increase School 
Absences?” The Review of Economics and Statistics 91 (4) (2009): 682–694.  
25 Joshua S. Graff Zivin and Matthew J. Neidell, “The Impact of Pollution on Worker Productivity,” NBER Working 
Paper No. 17004, National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2011, 
http://www.columbia.edu/~mn2191/w17004.pdf. 
26 Adam Sieminski, “Energy and the Economy,” 2010 EIA-SAIS Energy Conference, Washington, D.C., April 6–7, 
2010, http://www.eia.doe.gov/conference/2010/session5/sieminski.pdf. 
27 National Academy of Sciences, Hidden Costs of Energy. 
28 James Hamilton, “Oil Prices and the Economic Downturn,” Testimony Prepared for the Joint Economic 
Committee of the U.S. Congress, May 2009; James Hamilton, “Historical Oil Shocks,” working paper, Department 
of Economics, University of California, San Diego, February 2011, Table 1, 33, 
http://dss.ucsd.edu/~jhamilto/oil_history.pdf. 
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activity since the 1970s–perhaps because our economy’s oil intensity has been diminishing, 
because policy-makers have learned how to respond better to these shocks, or because the U.S. 
economy is more flexible today than it was–evidence from the most recent recession suggests 
that our vulnerability to oil shocks has not disappeared.29 
 Oil consumption also raises geopolitical and national security issues. For more than fifty 
years, the United States has maintained a military presence in the Persian Gulf. Although it is 
difficult to disentangle energy security from other national security goals, the need to guard 
against the possibility of oil disruptions has added urgency to U.S. military action. According to 
Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser under Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. 
Bush, “What gave enormous urgency to [the Persian Gulf War] was the issue of oil.”30  
* * * 
Estimates of Private and External Costs of Various Energy Sources. Smart energy policy 
must take into account the full social cost of energy production. This includes the private costs of 
building, maintaining, operating, and fueling electricity generating plants or transportation 
vehicles, as well as the external costs to health and the environment. Making good energy policy 
decisions has been especially difficult because the extent of the private and external costs has not 
always been clear. Indeed, without access to full, transparent information about the true costs of 
energy sources, policy-makers have not had the tools to make the best choices for the economy 
and the welfare of the American people. With an “apples to apples” comparison of actual costs, 
                                                            
29 Olivier Blanchard and Jordi Gali, “The Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Price Shocks: Why are the 2000s So 
Different from the 1970s?” NBER Working Paper No. 13368, National Bureau of Economic Research, September 
2007; James Hamilton, “Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007–2008,” Department of Economics, 
University of California, San Diego, April 2009, http://dss.ucsd.edu/~jhamilto/Hamilton_oil_shock_08.pdf. 
30 “Oral History: Brent Scowcroft,” interview with PBS Frontline, January 1996, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/scowcroft/1.html. 
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we can help level the playing field among the various energy sources by providing more-accurate 
information for the public discussion around energy policy.  
Table 1 provides new and what we believe are the most complete estimates of the costs of 
electricity production for several energy-producing technologies, including coal, natural gas, 
nuclear, wind, solar, and hydroelectric. It reports the full life-cycle costs of creating new 
electricity-generating capacity using different types of electricity sources; that is, it shows the 
total social cost per unit of energy of starting up and operating a new plant over the entire 
lifetime of the plant (sometimes called the “levelized cost”) including the health and 
environmental costs associated with electricity production. These costs are divided into private 
costs (the cost of building, fueling, operating, and maintaining a plant); non-carbon external costs 
(primarily the costs to health); and carbon-related external costs due to climate change.31 The 
sources for the estimates of the private costs are based on our calculations, described in detail in 
our paper for The Hamilton Project32; estimates for non-carbon costs are from the National 
Academy of Sciences33; and estimates for carbon-related costs are from the Interagency Working 
Group on the Social Cost of Carbon.34 We are unaware of any previous effort to pull these cost 
components together.  
 
[Insert Table 1- The Private, External and Social Costs of Electricity Generation] 
 
 
                                                            
31 Energy is usually measured in kWh, which is equal to the amount of energy consumed by a 100-watt light bulb if 
turned on for ten hours. 
32 Michael Greenstone and Adam Looney, “A Strategy for America’s Energy Future: Illuminating Energy’s Full 
Costs,” The Hamilton Project strategy paper, Brookings Institution, May 2011, 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_links/05_energy_greenstone_looney.pdf. 
33 National Academy of Sciences, Hidden Costs of Energy. 
34 Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, “Technical Support Document.” 
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Although we attempt to draw on the best available data and research when producing 
these estimates, there is substantial uncertainty around many of these costs. For some energy 
sources, estimates of non-carbon external costs are difficult to quantify or are simply not 
available. For example, for nuclear and hydroelectric power, the costs from nuclear accidents or 
from damage to fisheries are very real, but few studies have reliably estimated those costs. 
Additionally, the prices of fuel sources are determined by market forces, and can rise or fall over 
time, leading to changes in private costs. Similarly, innovation has reduced the costs of many 
emerging technologies and may continue to reduce costs in the future.  
 The fifth column shows estimates of the levelized private costs of generating new 
electricity from different sources. For baseline power (power that is not subject to interruption), 
hydroelectric and coal are the least expensive energy sources when measured by private costs.  
However, these private costs do not take into account the significant external costs 
stemming from many electricity sources. The sixth column shows the non-carbon external costs 
associated with different types of electricity sources, such as negative effects on health and the 
environment. Coal has high non-carbon external costs of 3.4¢ per kWh–roughly the same size as 
its private costs for existing capacity and more than 50 percent of its private costs for new 
capacity. The next column shows the costs associated with carbon emissions, assuming an SCC 
of $21.4 per ton (the preferred estimate of the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of 
Carbon).  
 The final column shows the social costs, which is the sum of all private and external 
costs. The costs of several electricity sources increase dramatically when the full costs of 
production are included. For example, the social cost of existing coal plants is more than double 
the  private cost  (8.8¢ compared to 3.2¢); the social cost of new conventional coal plants is 
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roughly 83 percent higher than the private costs (11.5¢ compared to 6.2¢), making coal the most 
expensive new nonrenewable source of energy. Conversely, for many other electricity-producing 
technologies, such as hydro, nuclear, wind, and solar, the private costs make up the vast majority 
of the social costs. 
 Estimates of the costs of “intermittent” energy sources–wind and solar–must also be 
adjusted to reflect the fact that they cannot be compared directly to those of base-loading 
technologies: wind power plants produce power only when there is wind, and solar power plants 
produce power only when there is sunlight. Sunny and windy times of the day or year do not 
always correspond to times when demand for power is greatest. Consequently, these types of 
energy are less valuable even if the cost per kWh is the same as coal, natural gas, or other 
“dispatching” energy sources (sources that can be turned on and off to produce power when 
needed most). Similarly, cost estimates for “peaking” generation technologies, such as natural 
gas combustion turbines, overstate their costs because they are specifically designed to be used 
in times of very high demand for electricity. 
 To put these sources on comparable footing, we created hypothetical plants that include 
intermittent technologies paired with a peaking generation technology (natural gas combustion 
turbines) that could meet energy needs during periods when solar or wind power is unavailable. 
These estimates, which we label “Combined Peaking and Intermittent” in Table 1, suggest that 
some versions of these combined plants could be competitive with many existing technologies if 
the full social costs of energy production were taken into account. For example, the combined 
wind/combustion turbine power plant would have social costs almost 2¢ per kWh less than that 
of new coal capacity. However, this combined wind/combustion turbine technology would still 
have significantly higher social costs than many other options, including new conventional 
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natural gas power plants and existing coal power plants. Furthermore, the wind and solar 
estimates are based on siting plants in optimal locations for harvesting these energy sources; the 
cost estimates would be higher, potentially significantly so, in other locations. 
 Figure 5 summarizes several of the most important electricity sources from Table 1. 
These sources are shown in order of their private costs. The private costs are in black, the non-
carbon external costs (mostly health costs) are black-and-white checkered, and carbon costs due 
to climate change are in light gray. The dramatic differences in the private and social costs of 
different energy sources illustrate how the low-private-cost energy sources we rely on often 
come with high external costs. 
 
[Insert Figure 5- The Private, External and Social Costs of Electricity Generation] 
 
 
When private costs alone are considered, existing coal power plants appear to be a great 
deal. These plants account for roughly 45 percent of the electricity in the United States, and they 
do so at an average price of 3.2¢ per kWh. This appears to be a bargain, but the true costs are 
much higher–in fact, they are 170 percent higher. Each kWh of coal-generated electricity comes 
with an additional 5.6¢ per kWh of damages to our well-being, from a combined 3.4¢ per kWh 
of non-climate-change-related damages (primarily health-related) and 2.2¢ per kWh of climate-
change-related damages. Although these costs are not listed on our monthly utility bills, they are 
nevertheless real. They show up in shorter life spans, higher health care bills, and a changing 
climate that poses risks to our way of life. 
 Figure 5 also reports on the costs of other electricity sources. Electricity from new coal 
plants is more expensive than from existing plants, largely due to the capital costs of building the 
plant; however, because new plants are slightly cleaner, external costs are modestly lower. Once 
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the full costs of all energy sources are accounted for, natural gas power plants are among the 
least expensive electricity sources. This outcome reflects the low prices of natural gas due to the 
recent dramatic increase in reserves and the fact that the health and environmental costs 
associated with natural gas are lower than for other fossil fuels. (At the time of writing, the 
environmental costs associated with the extraction of natural gas through ‘fracking’ are largely 
unknown and could increase the social costs of natural gas use.)  
For vehicles and transportation, the story is similar. From sticker prices on new cars to 
the price at the pump, the private costs of transportation are readily apparent to most Americans. 
The private costs to purchase, maintain, and fuel the average car add up to about $0.51 per 
vehicle mile traveled over the car’s lifetime.35 But cars, trucks, and other vehicles also impose 
costs by polluting the air, emitting greenhouse gases, contributing to traffic on busy roads, and 
through injuries and deaths from car crashes.36 These external costs amount to more than $0.10 
per vehicle mile traveled, or roughly $16,000 for a car that is driven 150,000 miles37–which 
represents more than 20 percent of the car’s lifetime private costs. 
An additional consequence of the costs in Table 1 is that industry and consumers have 
little incentive to change their energy preferences based on comparison of direct costs. This is 
because coal and gasoline are comparatively inexpensive when only their private costs are 
considered.  
 In addition to the private and external costs of these energy sources, policies to influence 
energy production also consume significant fiscal resources. Table 2 details the many subsidies 
                                                            
35 Internal Revenue Service, “2011 Standard Mileage Rates,” Notice 2010-88, 2010. 
36 Ian W.H. Parry and Kenneth A. Small, “Does Britain or the United States Have the Right Gasoline Tax?” 
American Economic Review 95 (4) (2005): 1276–1289. 
37 Ian W.H. Parry, Margaret Walls, and Winston Harrington, “Automobile Externalities and Policies,” Discussion 
Paper 06-26 (rev. ed.), Resources for the Future, January 2007, http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-06-26-
REV.pdf. 
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and financial incentives for different types of energy production provided by federal, state, and 
local governments. The higher cost per kWh for some sources is frequently justified as the result 
of efforts to jump-start innovations that are necessary to lower costs. 
 
[Insert Table 2 - Federal Energy Subsidies] 
 
Other government programs also give a boost to preferred energy sources. Liability for 
nuclear disasters is capped at $12.6 billion, and oil companies’ responsibility for spills is capped 
at $350 million for onshore facilities and $75 million for offshore facilities.38 Thus, these energy 
producers are protected from the risks they impose on society, liabilities that other businesses are 
required to shoulder.39 Additionally, federal and state legislation has granted a host of subsidies 
for ethanol production and use, including a tax credit equal to $0.45 per gallon for blending 
ethanol with other fuels and a variety of other standards that require the use of ethanol.40 These 
subsidies impose a substantial fiscal cost on taxpayers while creating market distortions. 
 Efforts to address the environmental, health, and climate-related effects of our current 
energy sources are often derided as too costly. But Table 1 emphasizes that many current energy 
sources are already more costly than perceived; those costs are simply more diffuse and less 
salient because they indirectly impact health, economic activity, the environment, and national 
                                                            
38 Environmental Protection Agency, “Oil Pollution Act Overview,” 
http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/lawsregs/opaover.htm; Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Public Affairs, 
“Fact Sheet on Nuclear Insurance and Disaster Relief Funds,” August 2010, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/fact-sheets/funds-fs.pdf. 
39 Michael Greenstone, “The Benefits of Cap-and-Trade Would Have Exceeded Its Costs,” Up Front blog, The 
Hamilton Project, Brookings Institution, July 2010, 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0730_climate_change_greenstone.aspx. 
40 Department of Energy, “Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC),” 
http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/laws/law/US/399; Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Transportation and 
Air Quality, “EPA Finalizes 2011 Renewable Fuel Standards,” November 2010, 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/renewablefuels/420f10056.pdf; John Collins Rudolf, “End Ethanol Subsidies, 
Senators Say,” The New York Times, November 30, 2010, http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/end-ethanol-
subsidies-senators-say/. 
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security. Although there are undoubtedly costs associated with moving to energy sources that 
require higher private outlays, the introduction of policies that cause producers of all energy 
sources to recognize the full social (i.e. private plus external) costs will level the playing field 
and improve our well-being. 
 For example, EPA analyses indicate that the benefits of recently proposed policies to 
address climate change would have exceeded their costs. The analyses suggest cumulative 
domestic costs of a cap-and-trade bill at $600 billion to $1 trillion through 2050.41 But the global 
cumulative benefits of the emissions reductions produced by enacting a cap-and-trade system 
would be approximately $1.5 trillion to $1.7 trillion over the same period, indicating that the 
benefits would have been much larger than the costs. Although a substantial proportion of these 
benefits would accrue outside the United States, many believe that the adoption of such a carbon 
policy would lead other countries to implement similar policies to reduce carbon emissions that 
would produce substantial benefits for the United States.  
* * * 
Reforming Energy Policy. Energy consumption is critical to economic growth and quality of 
life. America’s energy system, however, is malfunctioning. The status quo is characterized by a 
tilted playing field, where energy choices are based on the visible costs that appear on utility bills 
and at the gas pump. This system masks the external costs arising from those energy choices, 
including shorter lives, higher health care expenses, a changing climate, and weakened national 
security. As a result, society pays unnecessarily high costs for energy.  
                                                            
41 Greenstone, “The Benefits of Cap-and-Trade Would Have Exceeded Its Costs.” 
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New “rules of the road” could level the energy playing field. Drawing from our work for 
The Hamilton Project, we offer the following principles for reforming U.S. energy policies in 
order to increase Americans’ well-being: 
 1. Appropriately price the external costs of energy production and use. Fossil fuels such 
as coal, oil, and natural gas have costs beyond what users pay to the utility company or at the gas 
pump. These costs–ranging from increases in lung disease and infant mortality to problems 
associated with climate change–have been quantified and can be expressed in dollar terms. As 
argued in the Hamilton Project paper “An Economic Strategy to Address Climate Change and 
Promote Energy Security”42 and elsewhere, the best approach is to price these costs directly, 
through cap and trade or tax policies. If firms and consumers faced the full cost of their energy 
use, they would have a greater incentive to make more-informed and socially efficient decisions 
about energy consumption. 
 2. Fund basic research development and demonstration. Many believe that technological 
innovations are the solution to finding cleaner low-cost energy sources–in other words, that we 
will innovate our way out of our energy and climate change problems. Unfortunately, there is 
little incentive for the private sector to undertake either basic research or technology 
demonstration projects that are good for society because they may not offer the promise of a 
profitable private return. One impediment is the lack of a clear price signal that provides the right 
incentive for innovation. A second impediment is the fact that the fruits of basic research and 
demonstration investments–ideas and methods, as well as information about the commercial 
viability of these innovations–are hard to capture as they are easily shared among competitors. 
                                                            
42 Jason Furman, Jason Bordoff, Manasi A. Deshpande, and Pascal Noel, “An Economic Strategy to Address 
Climate Change and Promote Energy Security,” The Hamilton Project strategy paper, Brookings Institution, October 
2007, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/10climatechange_furman/10_climatechange_furman.pdf. 
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This impediment would exist even in the presence of cap and trade or a tax based on carbon’s 
social costs. This creates a critical role for government research to provide funding and support 
for the types of basic research that could help facilitate the creation of low-cost, clean energy 
sources.  
 3. Make regulations more efficient. Regulation has played, and will continue to play, a 
significant role in addressing the environmental and health consequences of energy consumption. 
The current process for promulgating regulations needs to be updated to promote rules that are 
more efficient and cost-effective. By requiring cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the potential 
impact of regulations and by assessing the reliability of empirical studies that are used to 
complete that analysis, we can greatly enhance the effectiveness and reputation of our 
environmental regulatory system. Furthermore, to ensure their ongoing value, an independent, 
automatic retrospective review of economically significant regulations is critical. If these reviews 
find that the costs exceed the benefits, then the regulations should be amended or removed. 
Finally, genuine reform may involve rethinking and potentially eliminating regulations that 
become superfluous or counterproductive after energy sources are priced. 
4. Address climate change on a global scale. Climate change is distinct from many 
environmental and energy-related issues in that it is global in scope and requires a global effort 
to address. Although the United States is a leading emitter today, in the future the bulk of 
emissions growth will come from developing countries. From a pragmatic standpoint, this means 
that any viable effort to address climate change must involve a coordinated approach by many 
countries. Negotiations have been complicated, however, and there are smaller steps that can be 
taken immediately to start down the path toward a global solution. This effort can begin today 
with a number of measures such as building the capability to monitor total net emissions at the 
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country level (this could be a building block for a trading system) through a combination of 
satellite- and land-based measurement systems. This would provide evidence of carbon 
emissions by countries and eliminate issues surrounding the accuracy of reporting, which has 
been a stumbling block in international negotiations. 
A fundamental change in our energy policy will not be easy and will come with costs, 
with some industries and regions in the U.S. economy being more affected than others. This is 
because U.S. households and businesses have made decisions based on the expectation of access 
to energy sources with relatively low private costs. One solution is to offer compensation to 
those that are harmed. On net, however, the recognition of the full costs of our energy choices 
would deliver a future of healthier and longer lives, an improved environment, and greater 
national security. 
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Figure 1. World Energy Consumption by Country, 1980 to 2008 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics Database, November 2009, 
http://www.eia.gov/emeu/international.  
 
Figure 2. Main Sources of Non-Climate-Change-Related Damages, in 2005 
 
Vehicle costs refer to the total life-cycle costs of producing and operating.  
Source: National Academy of Sciences, Hidden Costs of Energy (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 
2010). 
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Figure 3. Mean Global Temperature and Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations, 1900 to 2099 
 
Multimodel average temperature; SRES A1B scenario. Source: KNMI Climate Explorer, http://climexp.knmi.nl/. 
Figure 4. Current and Predicted End-of-Century Daily Temperatures 
 
Hadley 3-A1Fl predictions, error corrected. Source: Olivier Deschenes and Michael Greenstone, “Climate Change, 
Mortality, and Adaptation.” 
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Figure 5. The Private, External and Social Costs of Electricity Generation 
 
*The non-carbon external costs of nuclear power, including the risk of serious accidents, have not been quantified 
for this figure. Non-carbon external costs include only damages associated with operating the plant, not “upstream” 
costs from mining, drilling, and extraction of fuels (including any environmental costs associated with fracking), or 
from plant construction. Sources: See notes for Table 1.  
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Table 1.  The Private, External and Social Costs of Electricity Generation  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Type Technology Capacity 
Factorc 
(percent) 
Share of Current 
Generationd 
(percent) 
Private 
Costse,f 
(¢/kWh) 
Non-Carbon 
External Costs 
(¢/kWh)i 
Carbon- 
External Costsk  
(¢/kWh) 
Social 
Costsm 
(¢/kWh) 
A. Existing Capacitya 
Existing Coal 85 45 3.2 3.4 2.2 8.8 Fossil Fuels 
Existing Natural Gas 87 24 4.9 0.2 1.0 6.0 
Other Traditional Existing Nuclear 90 20 2.2 Unable to Quantify ≈0 2.2 
B. New Capacityb 
Base-Loading Technologies 
Coal (Dual Unit Advanced PC) 85   6.2 3.4 1.9 11.5 Fossil Fuels 
Natural Gas (Conventional Combined Cycle) 87   5.5 0.2 0.8 6.5 
Nuclear (PWR) 90   8.2-10.5g 
Unable to Quantify ≈0 8.2-10.5 Other Traditional 
Hydro 52   6.4 Unable to Quantify ≈0 6.4 
Geothermal 92   8.3 Unable to Quantify 0.1 8.4 Renewables 
Biomass 83   9.5 Unable to Quantify 0.0-2.7l 9.5-12.1 
Wind (Onshore) backed up with Natural Gas 
Combustion Turbine 85   8.9 0.1 0.8 9.7 
Combined 
Peaking and 
Intermittent Solar (PV) backed up with Natural Gas 
Combustion Turbine 85   12.2 0.1 0.9 13.2 
Peaking Generating Technologies 
Modified 
Traditional  Natural Gas (Conventional Combustion Turbine) 30   10.8 0.2 1.3 12.2 
Intermittent Generating Technologies 
Wind (Onshore) 34   8.0h Unable to Quantify ≈0 8.0 
Wind (Offshore) 34   19.1h Unable to Quantify ≈0 19.1 
Solar (PV) 25   19.5h Unable to Quantify ≈0 19.5 
Renewables  
Solar (Thermal) 18   29.7h Unable to Quantify ≈0 29.7 
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Notes and Sources for Table 1:  
All dollar figures are in 2010 U.S. Dollars (USD). Values not originally reported in 2010 USD are inflated using the 
Consumer Price Index. A technical appendix (available on request) includes a full description of the methodology 
and assumptions used to generate these estimates. Cost figures may not sum due to rounding. PC stands for 
pulverized coal, PV for photovoltaic, and PWR for pressurized water reactor.  
Sources: Authors’ calculations; Yangbo Du and John E. Parsons, “Update on the Costs of Nuclear Power,” Working 
Paper 09-004, MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, May 2009, 
http://web.mit.edu/mitei/docs/spotlights/nuclear-fuel-cycle-du.pdf; Energy Information Administration, Annual 
Energy Outlook 2011 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, April 2011), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/.; 
Energy Information Administration, “Updated Capital Costs for Electricity Generating Plants,” November 2010, 
http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/beck_plantcosts/pdf/updatedplantcosts.pdf; Energy Information Administration, 
“Consumption Price and Expenditure Estimates, State Energy Data System (SEDS),” June 2010, Table S6a, 
http://www.eia.gov/states/hf.jsp?incfile=sep_sum/plain_html/sum_pr_eu.html; Energy Information Administration, 
“Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2011,” 2010, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/electricity_generation.html; Energy Information Administration, “Monthly Energy 
Review,” April 2011, Table 7.2a, “Electricity Net Generation: Total (All Sectors),” 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/query/mer_data.asp?table=T07.02; Energy Information 
Administration, “Electric Power Annual,” April 2011 (rev.), Table 5.3, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epat5p3.html; Energy Information Administration, “Electric Power 
Monthly,” April 2011, Tables 4.10.A and 4.13.A, http://www.eia.doe.gov/electricity/data.cfm#avgcost; Energy 
Information Administration, “Updates by Energy Source, State Energy Data System (SEDS),” April 2011, Table 
F23, http://www.eia.gov/states/hf.jsp?incfile=sep_fuel/html/fuel_nu.html; Interagency Working Group on Social 
Cost of Carbon, “Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under 
Executive Order 12866,” February 2010, http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/regulations/scc-tsd.pdf; Internal Revenue 
Service, “How to Depreciate Property,” Publication 946, Cat. No. 13081F, 2011; National Academy of Sciences, 
Hidden Costs of Energy (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2010). 
 
a. Estimates for existing coal, natural gas, and nuclear facilities assume the same fuel costs and capacity 
factors as the new coal dual unit advanced PC, the new natural gas conventional combined cycle, and the 
new nuclear (PWR) plants, respectively. Existing plants are assumed to have two-thirds the operating, 
management, and maintenance costs of the corresponding new plants to reflect the fact that existing plants, 
on average, are subject to less stringent environmental standards and use older technologies. Existing plants 
are assumed to have fully depreciated all initial capital costs. To account for the fact that existing plants 
are, on average, less efficient than new plants, we use the estimated heat rates for existing plants in 2009 
from Energy Information Administration, “Electric Power Annual,” April 2011 (rev.), Table 5.3, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epat5p3.html. The heat rates are 10,461 Btu/kWh for coal, 
8,160 Btu/kWh for natural gas, and 10,460 Btu/kWh for nuclear.  
b. These estimates do not include experimental technologies such as plants with carbon capture and 
sequestration or integrated gasification combined-cycle plants. 
c. Source: Energy Information Administration, “Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources in the 
Annual Energy Outlook 2011,” 2011, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/electricity_generation.html. 
d. Source: Energy Information Administration, “Monthly Energy Review,” April 2011, Table 7.2a, 
“Electricity Net Generation: Total (All Sectors),” 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/query/mer_data.asp?table=T07.02. 
e. Private cost estimates for new capacity are levelized costs: they reflect the present discounted value of 
the total cost of constructing, maintaining, and operating an electricity-generating plant over its entire 
lifetime and are expressed in terms of real cents per kWh.  
f. Authors’ estimates based on a model developed by Yangbo Du and John E. Parsons, “Update on the 
Costs of Nuclear Power,” Working Paper 09-004, MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy 
Research, May 2009, http://web.mit.edu/mitei/docs/spotlights/nuclear-fuel-cycle-du.pdf. Most cost inputs 
for new capacity, including overnight capital costs, operation and management costs, and heat rates, come 
from Energy Information Administration, “Updated Capital Costs for Electricity Generating Plants,” 
November 2010, http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/beck_plantcosts/pdf/updatedplantcosts.pdf. Fuel price estimates 
for coal and natural gas come from Energy Information Administration, “Electric Power Monthly,” April 
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2011, Tables 4.10.A and 4.13.A, http://www.eia.doe.gov/electricity/data.cfm#avgcost; those for nuclear 
power come from Energy Information Administration, “Updates by Energy Source, State Energy Data 
System (SEDS),” April 2011, Table F23, 
http://www.eia.gov/states/hf.jsp?incfile=sep_fuel/html/fuel_nu.html; and those for biomass come from 
Energy Information Administration, “Consumption Price and Expenditure Estimates, State Energy Data 
System (SEDS),” June 2010, Table S6a, 
http://www.eia.gov/states/hf.jsp?incfile=sep_sum/plain_html/sum_pr_eu.html. All plants are assumed to 
have identical forty-year lifetimes. Estimates for new capacity refer to plants coming online in 2017 to 
compensate for the significant lead time required to construct many types of new plants. 
g. Range reflects alternative financing costs. The low end of the range assumes a weighted average cost of 
capital of 7.8 percent (the same assumption for all other technologies), while the high end of the range 
assumes a weighted average cost of capital of 10 percent. This approach follows The Future of Nuclear 
Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003), 
http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/; and Du and Parsons, “Update on the Costs of Nuclear Power.” The 
capital cost estimates from Energy Information Administration, “Updated Capital Costs for Electricity 
Generating Plants” assume that the nuclear plant is built in a brownfield site; greenfield sites may be more 
expensive.  
h. Estimates for wind and solar are based on current market costs, which have been declining due to 
advances in technology. Some analysts argue that improved technology will substantially reduce the price 
of wind and solar power. For example, if overnight capital costs of solar PV were reduced to $2,000/kW, 
levelized costs for solar PV would drop to 8.6¢/kWh.  
i. Source: National Academy of Sciences, Hidden Costs of Energy, 92 (coal) and 118 (natural gas). The 
NAS estimates the monetized costs resulting from emissions of SO2, NOx, and PM2.5 and PM10 (two 
forms of particulate matter) from existing natural gas and coal power plants, assuming a value of a 
statistical life of $6 million (in 2000 USD). These estimates do not include external costs other than from 
those four air pollutants, nor do they include “upstream” costs resulting from mining, drilling, construction, 
and other activities not directly associated with electricity generation. While it is likely that new plants are 
more efficient, the assumption that both existing and new plants have the same external costs reflects the 
fact that both existing and new plants are included under the same SO2 and NOx cap-and-trade cap.  
j. Reliable estimates of the non-carbon external costs are unavailable for many electricity-generation 
technologies, even for technologies like nuclear or hydroelectric, which have demonstrable environmental 
or health costs. We label non-carbon external costs of these technologies “Unable to Quantify.”  
k. Source: For tons of CO2/Btu or tons of CO2/MWh (megawatt hour), see Energy Information 
Administration, “Updated Capital Costs for Electricity Generating Plants”; for external costs of carbon at 
$22.5/ton of CO2 (2010 USD), see the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, “Technical 
Support Document.” 
l. The range of carbon emissions estimates reflects uncertainty regarding the source of biomass fuel 
materials.  
m. Intermittent energy sources, such as wind and solar, produce power only during periods of sufficient 
wind and sunlight. The costs in this table do not attempt to monetize the reduction in value that this 
intermittency imposes on energy users. On an adjusted basis, wind and solar would be more costly. 
Conversely, peaking generating technologies, such as natural gas combustion turbines, are used only during 
periods of fluctuating high demand, and thus appear expensive in this comparison. For a more detailed 
discussion, see Paul Joskow, “Comparing the Costs of Intermittent and Dispatchable Electricity Generating 
Technologies,” CEEPR Working Paper, MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, 
September 2010, http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/6317. In an attempt to define a more appropriate 
comparison of wind and solar to other base-loading technologies, “Combined Peaking and Intermittent” 
presents estimates of hybrid wind and solar PV facilities that are backed up by natural gas combustion 
turbines during periods of intermittency. These hypothetical plants assume that a renewable source is paired 
with a natural gas combustion turbine of sufficient capacity such that the turbine could fully substitute for 
the renewable source if it produced no output during some time periods. The average capacity factor of the 
paired natural gas combustion turbine is chosen such that the average capacity factor for the combined 
plant is equal to 85 percent (roughly the capacity factor for traditional coal and natural gas combined-cycle 
plants). 
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Table 2.  Federal Energy Subsidies 
 
Type  FY 2007 Net 
Generation 
(billion KWh) 
Federal Subsidy 
and Support Value 
2007 (million 
dollars) 
Coal  1,946  854 
Refined Coal  72  2,156 
Natural Gas and 
Petroleum Liquids  919  227 
Nuclear  794  1,267 
Biomass (and biofuels)  40  36 
Geothermal  15  14 
Hydroelectric  258  174 
Solar  1  14 
Wind  31  724 
Landfill Gas  6  8 
Municipal Solid Waste  9  1 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration, “Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy Markets: 
2007,” April 2008, Table 35, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/subsidy2/.  
 
